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The events of 9/11 and the occurrence of major natural disasters in recent years has resulted in increased awareness and 
renewed desire to protect critical infrastructure that are the pillars to maintaining what has become normal life in our 
economy. The problem has been compounded because the increased connectedness between the various sectors of the 
economy has resulted in interdependencies that allow for problems and issues with one infrastructure to affect other 
infrastructures. This area is now being investigated extensively after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) prioritized 
this issue. There is now a vast extant of literature in the area of infrastructure interdependencies and the modeling of it. This 
paper presents a synthesis and survey of the literature in the area of infrastructure interdependency modeling methods and 
proposes a framework for classification of these studies. The framework classifies infrastructure interdependency modeling 
and analysis methods into four quadrants in terms of system complexities and risks. The directions of future research are also 
discussed in this paper.  
Keywords 
Infrastructure interdependency, modeling, literature review 
INTRODUCTION 
The human habitat is constantly evolving into a more connected society with provisioning of services within the society 
requiring greater dependence on highly-coupled critical infrastructure systems to deliver key services. For example, after 
analyzing the media reports of thirteen weeks following 9/11 events, Mendonca and Wallace (2006) found 46 out of 238 
service disruptions during that period of time are caused by infrastructure interdependencies. The economy of a region and 
the well-being of the citizenry are therefore closely linked to the proper functioning of critical infrastructure systems.  The 
final report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) defines critical infrastructure as “the 
framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising of identifiable industries, institutions, including people and 
procedures, and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and 
economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning of governments at all levels, and society as a whole.” The 
national infrastructure protection plan (NIPP) defines 17 critical infrastructures as follows: Agriculture and food; water; 
public health; emergency services; defense industrial base; energy; information technology; banking and finance; 
telecommunications; dams; transportation systems; chemical; postal and shipping; national monuments and icons; 
government facilities;  commercial facilities; nuclear reactors; materials, and waste. In addition, Barnes and Newbold (2005) 
view humans as a critical infrastructure due to the core role the humans’ intelligence plays in the operations of infrastructure.  
 Ensuring the resilience and reliability of these infrastructures, which are vulnerable to natural disaster and man-made attacks, 
has proved challenging. One of the reasons is that the infrastructures are interdependent which leads to the fact that the failure 
of one infrastructure could cause serious consequences to others. In our research, we adopt the definitions of infrastructure 
interdependencies from (Rinaldi et al., 2001) as “a bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures through which the 
state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other.” 
The area of infrastructure interdependency has been studied from different perspectives. For example, Chang et al. (2007) 
develop a conceptual framework for characterizing the nature, extent and severity of the impacts of infrastructure failure 
interdependencies in disasters from the standpoint of impacts to the communities. (Zimmerman, 2004) identifies and codes 
news media reports relating to infrastructure interdependencies. A database on infrastructures is created and three measures 
for infrastructure interdependencies are proposed to facilitate the use of these data. Amin (2002) summarizes 
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interdependencies of electricity infrastructures, telecommunication infrastructures, and transportation infrastructures with 
other critical infrastructures. Our study, however, only focuses on techniques used in modeling infrastructure 
interdependencies and not on exploring other areas related to infrastructure interdependencies. 
Modeling methods have received increasing attention in infrastructure interdependency research in that it will assists in 
understanding how a given infrastructure depends on others. This modeling effort requires multiple viewpoints and a broad 
set of interdisciplinary knowledge from a variety of areas such as computer science, economics, social science and public 
policy (Peerenboom and Fisher, 2007).   In addition, Rinaldi (2004)identifies several factors leading to the complexity of 
infrastructure interdependencies modeling, such as lack of real-time data and metrics for risk assessment.  Although great 
progresses have been made to analyze individual infrastructure, the science of infrastructure interdependencies is relatively 
new (Peerenboom and Fisher, 2007). Difficult issues related to system complexity and nonlinear behavior, uncertainty, and 
human factors, remain largely unanswered. Therefore, previous studies (Rinaldi, 2004; Rinaldi et al., 2001; Peerenboom and 
Fisher, 2007) have addressed the needs of infrastructure interdependencies modeling methods and called for the papers 
related to this topic. We respond to these calls by providing taxonomy of infrastructure interdependency modeling and 
analysis methods. 
This paper attempts to provide a review and synthesis of previous study and propose a framework for infrastructure 
interdependencies modeling. The contributions of this study are twofold: First, this framework is able to guide researchers to 
select and apply the most appropriate models for their study. Second, this paper identifies some potential research directions 
which need further studies. As depicted in Figure 1, we classify the infrastructure interdependencies modeling studies into 
four quadrants in terms of the complexity and risk of the systems they examine. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
First we discuss system complexity and risk and then review typical infrastructure interdependency models. Next we discuss 
the applications of infrastructure interdependencies modeling in information system security. Finally we conclude with the 
summary of promising directions for future research. 
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Figure 1. The Framework of Infrastructure Interdependencies Modeling and Analysis Methods 
 
COMPLEXITY AND RISK 
Complexity and risk are two important characteristics of interdependent infrastructure systems. In this section, we review 
their applications in infrastructure interdependency and related modeling methods. 
System Complexity 
System complexities are usually caused by the intricate relationships among different elements of the system. The complexity 
of interdependent infrastructure systems could be measured by the number of subsystems, the ambiguity of their 
interdependencies, and the magnitude of cascading effects, etc. Complex systems modeling methods have emerged in 
infrastructure interdependency study recently. These methods build on the ground that a complex system consists of 
interacting agents that act on their limited and local information (Amaral and Uzzi, 2007). Complex systems modeling 
methods are suitable for infrastructure interdependencies study due to the following reasons: first, the overall performance of 
the whole system is affected and determined by the interconnected infrastructures, which play a similar role to the agents in 
complex system. Second, complex theory modeling provide effective tools to analyze the physical as well as related 
organizational and social-economic problem. Third, complex systems modeling utilize simulations tools to validate their 
model, which reduces the reliance on real data.  Complex systems modeling methods differ from other modeling methods in 
the following ways: (1) Most of other modeling methods focus on the decomposition of a system, whereas complex systems 
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modeling use “system thinking” to analyze the system. (2) Most of other modeling methods aim to enumerate and quantify 
all kinds of risks associated with interdependent infrastructures, whereas complex systems modeling employs simulation 
tools to simulate the system behaviors under various circumstances.  
System Risk 
Infrastructure interdependencies increase the risk of impacts on services if natural or man-made disasters occur. Risk is 
defined by (Kaplan, 1997) as the function of scenario, likelihood and consequence. Peerenboom and Fisher (2007) propose a 
similar definition of risk as a function of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences, i.e., 
risk=threats*vulnerabilities*consequences. In their definition, threat is a function of intent and effective capability; 
vulnerability is the characteristics of an asset that render it susceptible to destruction, and consequence refers to both direct 
and indirect effects.  Consistent with previous studies (Haimes, 2002; Longstaff and Haimes, 2002), we divide the risk-based 
modeling process into two phases: risk assessment and risk management. The modeling methods used in these two phases are 
detailed in the following sections. 
Risk Assessment  
In risk assessment phase, the researchers often attempt to answer the following three questions: what can go wrong? What is 
the likelihood that it would go wrong? What are the consequences(Kaplan, 1997)? In order to identify the risks exhaustively 
and assess them accurately, some frameworks for risk assessment have been proposed as follows. 
Panzieri (2004) proposes a framework to analyze and prioritize resources to protect U.S critical infrastructure from terrorist 
attacks. This framework which provides procedures for risk assessment includes the following steps: characterize assets, 
determine consequence, define threats, assess vulnerabilities, and analyze system risk. Interdependencies analysis, as 
important part of this framework, is incorporated in each of these steps.  
Moselhi et al. (2005) suggest a reliability-based approach to assess the risk of critical infrastructure systems. Their approach 
consists of interdependency identification, interdependent CIS reliability modeling, socioeconomic cost assessment, multi-
objective optimization and sensitivity analysis, and a simulation and data collection prototype system. Based on this 
approach, a prototype simulation tools is developed and applied to transportation and telecommunication networks modeling. 
Peerenboom et al. (2001) propose a framework for assessing the risks associated with infrastructure interdependencies. The 
framework includes five steps: characterize assets, determine consequences, define threats, assess vulnerabilities, and analyze 
system risk.  
Lambert and Sarda (2005) propose a nine-stage framework to identify the risk of interdependent infrastructures. The first six 
stages address the iterative process of risk identification and the other three steps focus on risk management. Their framework 
includes a scenario identification algorithm for detecting and responding to knowledge about infrastructure risk.  
Ezell et al. (2000) propose an infrastructure risk analysis model which includes four phases: identifying risks to the 
infrastructures, modeling the risks to the infrastructures, assessing the infrastructures, and managing the risk to the 
infrastructures. In the first phase, the system is decomposed along the dimensions of function, component, structure, state, 
and vulnerability, and then a ranking of vulnerabilities and threats is established. In the second phase, the probability of the 
consequence under each scenario is evaluated. In the third phase, the conditional expected values for damages, consequences, 
or losses are calculated to quantify the risk associated with the extreme events. In the fourth stages, alternative approaches of 
improving system performance are generated for decision making. 
Based on the frameworks above, we find infrastructure interdependencies risk assessment usually includes three steps: 
scenario selection, infrastructure interdependencies identification, and vulnerability assessment. In the following section, we 
will review the modeling and analysis methods used in these three steps. 
Step 1: Scenario Selection 
 A scenario is a precise narrative or other description of a potential avenue of risk to the infrastructures (Lambert and Sarda, 
2005).  
Wei (1991) proposes failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis for scenario identification. The procedures of their 
approach are as follows: (1) documenting all probable failures, (2) determining the effect of each failure, (3) identifying 
single failure points, and (4) ranking each failure in accordance to a severity classification.  
Based on multi-attribute utility theory and graph theory, Michaud and Apostolakis (2006) present a methodology to rank the 
elements of a water-supply network. Accident scenarios are generated and their corresponding consequences are evaluated 
and ranked using value tree. A value tree, also called the “objective hierarchy”, captures the objectives of decision makers 
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that could be affected by a scenario. A value tree has two tiers. The fist tier represents the impacts and the second tier 
represents the performance measures of each impact.  
Lambert and Sarda (2005) report an approach to identify dependency scenarios in hurricane recovery. In their approach, data 
are collected by interview and document analysis and then are classified according to the functional units. The dependency 
scenarios are measured and compared to determine their priorities of being fixed. 
Step 2: Infrastructure Interdependency Identification 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) define three types of infrastructure interdependency failures: cascading failures, escalating failures, and 
common cause failures. Each failure is caused by different types of relationships between infrastructures. Identifying 
infrastructure interdependencies will enhance our understanding of the impacts of one infrastructure’s disruption on other 
infrastructures and facilities the predictions of the systems’ behaviors as a whole. 
Mendonca and Wallace (2006) illustrate how to use public reports to identify and assess the infrastructure interdependencies 
through content analysis. In their study, they utilize the New York Times as the data source to study the impacts of the 9/11 
terrorist attack on critical infrastructures in New York City. Their approach includes the following steps: identifying and 
classifying the articles reporting the incidents and associated disruptions by coding and entering them into a database. Then 
the disruptions to services provided by critical infrastructure were assessed and compared. A matrix, whose entry represents 
the number of impacts involving any two infrastructures, was create and the correlations between the infrastructures are 
calculated to evaluate the interdependencies. At last, the number of disruptions resulting from interdependencies is counted.  
Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment  
Ashparie et al. (2005) develop a value hierarchy to evaluate trade-offs between the different objectives of system. The values 
in the hierarchy are obtained through interviews with stakeholders and the internal documentation. The author further divided 
the objectives of the system into three components: operation cost, operational performance objectives and security. A utility 
function is developed based on this value hierarchy and decomposition. 
Risk Management  
In risk management phase, the following three questions need to be answered: what can be done and what options are 
available? What are the associated tradeoffs in terms of all cost, benefits, and risks? What are the impacts of current 
management decisions on future options (Haimes, 1998)? Altay and Green (2006) identify four typical activities of disaster 
operations management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Infrastructure interdependencies research, as a 
sub-stream of disaster management research, also focuses on the decision making in these activities.  
INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY MODELING  
There is a huge body of literature focuses on infrastructure interdependency modeling. Those studies draw on theories and 
methodologies from various research fields such as computer science and engineering, and they usually combine the complex 
system modeling and risk modeling. This section reviews several typical modeling methods which have been heavily used in 
infrastructure interdependency studies. 
Agent-based Model 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) propose that critical infrastructures, which are collections of interacting components, could be treated as 
complex adaptive systems (CASs)- a special case of complex systems. A CAS is a collection of intelligent agents which 
adapt to events and surrounding, interacting both competitively and cooperatively for the goods of system. From this 
perspective, infrastructures are composed of the components which are able to learn from past experiences and adapt their 
future behavior.  
Agent-based model is an effective approach to explore CASs. Agent-based model is a computational model which simulates 
the interactions of multiple agents. Physical components of infrastructures can be modeled as agents to allow analysis of their 
states. The agents could also simulate the decision and policy makers involved in infrastructure operations. Using these 
models, we could examine the consequence of the infrastructure disruptions and the resilience of the industries and firms. 
Barton (2000) introduces a model of infrastructure interdependencies employing agent-based approach. This model is 
developed by Sandia National Laboratory. The original model is called Aspen model in which each agent represents real-life 
decision-makers such as banks, households, manufacturing firms, and government agents. Each agent behaves like its real 
world counterpart to simulate their actions and sends message to each other to stimulate the complex interactions between 
their counterparts. Aspen-EE (Aspen Electricity Enhancement) model extends Aspen model by including the rules and agents 
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of electric power and gas infrastructure. The operation of each agent in Aspen-EE depends on the electricity agents and gas 
agents. 
Systems Dynamic Model 
Another promising modeling approach is systems dynamic. System dynamic, developed by Jay Forrester in early 1960s, is an 
approach to understand the complex systems. System dynamic is grounded in the theory of nonlinear dynamic and feedback 
control and has been widely used in the areas like ecology, economics, and engineering. A system dynamic model includes 
three components: causal loop diagrams, stock and flow diagrams, and equations. Causal loop diagrams visually capture the 
causal process between the variables at high level. Stock and flow diagrams consists of four elements: stock, flow, converter, 
and connector. Based on the stock and flow diagrams, equations are derived to further identify the quantitative relations 
between the variables.  The simulation models then are built to enable users to see how system responds when the conditions 
changed.  
Min et al. (2007) propose a model which employs system dynamics and nonlinear programming to determine how to allocate 
limited resource to physical infrastructures and to economic sectors under disruption. Electric power, natural gas, and 
petroleum model are built to capture the critical processes required to deliver products and services. The aggregate 
inventories and flows of materials/services are modeled as stocks and flows in SD model, respectively. These SD models 
enable analysts to examine how the economic impacts propagate through infrastructure network. Based on these models, 
experiments are conducted to compare the performance of three resource allocation algorithm in disaster scenarios. 
HHM Model 
Haimes (2002) provides a holistic risk assessment and management framework to model the risks of terrorism. He utilizes 
hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) to identify the infrastructure interdependencies and the multidimensional risks 
associated with them. HHM provides a tool to collect and synthesize the information related to risks. The philosophy of 
HHM is that multiple decompositions could help us to understand the interconnectedness and interdependencies of large-
scale and complex systems. A typical hierarchy of HHM consists of head-topic, subtopic and sub-subtopics, etc(Longstaff 
and Haimes, 2002). The exhaustive topic identification needs the involvement of stakeholders, decision-makers, and domain 
experts, along with careful search of journal, reports, and internet. Staudinger (2006) further extends the HHM framework 
and compared its performance with other methods. 
IIM Model  
Based on Leontief’s input-output model, which describes the equilibrium behavior of both national and regional economies 
and the degree of interconnectedness among various economic sectors, Haimes (2005) propose an inoperability input-output 
model (IIM) to characterize interdependencies among sectors. The principle assumption of IIM is that the level of economic 
dependency is the same as the level of physical dependency. One of the most important advantages of this model is that it is 
able to utilize the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database, which includes the production and consumption of 
commodities of about 500 sectors, as well as regional input-output Multiplier systems, which is a set of regional data. There 
are two kinds of IIM—static IIM and dynamic IIM. Static IIM defines the equilibrium state of the sectors, while dynamic IIM 
describes the process of the economy system state reaching the equilibrium and can be transformed into a static model 
through equivalent static inoperability. IIM provides a tool for accessing (1) direct economic impacts of certain infrastructure 
disruption, (2) trade-offs between reduction in economic losses and associated cost to carry out various recovery options. 
Linear Programming 
Linear programming has been used in infrastructure interdependency to explore those questions like how to allocate limited 
resources to mitigate the impacts of disaster and how to invest to optimize the operations of infrastructures. For example, the 
aim of the study conducted by(Lee et al., 2007) is to support emergency response organizations(EROs) at various levels to set 
priorities of restoration activities when an extreme event affect more than one infrastructures. This paper identifies five types 
of interdependencies: input, mutually dependent, co-located, shared, and exclusive-or. They use three mathematical 
programming models to examine the input interdependent system in normal state, disruption state and recovery state. To 
illustrate these models, cases of infrastructure interdependencies arising following the events of 9/11 are analyzed.  
Network Flow 
Network flow has been employed by previous studies to visualize and capture the infrastructure interdependencies. 
Dudenhoeffer et al. (2006) describe infrastructures as a network composed of nodes and edges. Nodes denote source, 
produces and consumes; Edges between two nodes denote a direct level of dependence between them. A set of mathematical 
formalisms are developed to define different types of interdependencies. They also introduced a software framework named 
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the Critical Infrastructure Modeling System (CIMS), which uses an agent-based approach to model infrastructure elements 
and support the interdependency evaluation and analysis. 
Nozick et al. (2005) also represent interdependent infrastructures through networks. They develop a mathematical framework 
to represent interconnected infrastructure networks. Their work also includes algorithms to estimate performance and 
optimize investment. This framework treats uncertainty in the capacity of links in the networks as a key characteristic and 
uses measures to reflect network performance. In their model, the arcs represent the connections between infrastructures and 
their capacities capture the relationships between the infrastructures. Markov and semi-Markov processes are employed to 
model the evolution of capacities on network links.  
Other Models 
Gursesli and Desrochers (2003) use Petri nets to capture the relationships between independent infrastructures. Their study 
illustrates how to model the interdependencies and the vulnerabilities using place invariants (P-invariants), and how to select 
recovery strategies using transition invariants (T-invariants) 
Simpson et al. (2005) develop a framework to evaluate the social and economic impact on a community in response to an 
extreme event. This framework employs fragility curves to measure the conditional probability of various infrastructures 
reaching or exceeding a particular damage state. Although the framework provides valuable information to support resource 
allocation and disaster preparedness, lacking of historical data makes fragility curves developing difficult for some 
infrastructures and constrains its applications. 
INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES AND INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 
Infrastructure interdependencies have great impacts on information system security. On one hand, widely-used information 
systems have increased interdependencies between infrastructures. On the other hand, decision makers rely on a variety of 
information systems to support the analysis of interdependencies and mitigation of their consequences. In addition, some 
infrastructure interdependency modeling methods have been applied in information systems studies to investigate 
interdependencies between software, hardware and business processes. In this section, we will review some examples of such 
studies. 
McNally et al. (2007) introduce an ontology-based information system which could represent and visualize critical 
infrastructure interdependencies. This system consists of five subsystems: users, a user interface, a database management 
systems, a model based management systems, and a knowledge base management system. By using object-oriented 
technologies, the knowledge base management system provides the capacities of knowledge representation and knowledge 
visualization. This information system could be used to define the hierarchical structure of system, specify the properties and 
functions of the system and understand the interdependencies of the systems. 
Brigl et al. (2003) present a three-layer graph-based model for modeling hospital information system. The three layers 
include: the domain layer, which describes the enterprise functions of a hospital, the logical tool layer, which describes the 
software application functions, and the physical tool layer, which describes the hardware components. These three layers 
together are able to describe the interdependencies between the elements in different layers, especially interdependencies 
between business processes and communication processes. 
Inspired by complex systems modeling introduced in section 2.2, Daskapan et al. (2004) propose a distributed defense 
system. In their systems, each computing entity (CE) is treated as an self-organized ‘cell’ which is responsible of regularly 
cloning and dispatching the process to its neighboring CEs. This system improves the ability of resource sharing and the level 
of security.  
Bagheri and Ghorbani (2007) propose a UML-based model to profile the different aspects of the critical infrastructure 
systems. This model consists of five high-level sub-models: ownership and management model, structure and organization 
model, resource model, risk model, and relationship model. This model is evaluated in terms of characteristics of critical 
infrastructure systems and the results show it can cover required dimensions and provide efficient means and tools for 
analysis. Min et al. (2007) use IDEF0 to describe the exchange of information between the individual infrastructures. More 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Table 1. The summary of Literature on Infrastructure Interdependencies Modeling Methods 
References  Level of Analysis Infrastructure 
Studied 
Modeling Method Scenario  
(Ashparie et 
al., 2005) 
National level  Electric power, water, 
healthcare network 
Simulation N/A 







Fragiligy curve  N/A 
(Lee et al., 
2007) 








(Moselhi et al., 
2005) 
Local level  Not specified Reliability-based 
approach 
N/A 
(Haimes, 2002) Multiple levels  Homeland system HHM Terrorist attacks 
(Haimes, 2005) National level  
and regional level 
Not specified Inoperability input-
output model 
Terrorist attack 
(Mili et al., 
2004) 
Local level  Electronic power  Game theory nature-generated hazard 
and man-made hazard 
(Nozick et al., 
2005) 




Network flow N/A 
(Newman et 
al., 2005) 










National level Electronic power and 
other infrastructures  
Agent-based  N/A 
(Dudenhoeffer 
et al., 2006) 
N/A Not specified Agent-based  Scenarios are generated by 
(1)manipulating individual 
nodes or edges and (2) 
developing baseline scripts 
(Min et al., 
2007) 













Local level  Electric power and 
other infrastructure 
Petri net Power disruption 
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We summarize the references related to infrastructure interdependency modeling and analysis in table 1.  From the table we 
can see that most of the current research mainly focuses on lifeline infrastructures like electricity power infrastructure, water 
infrastructure, gas infrastructure. The reason could be that those infrastructures have more direct impacts on our daily lives 
and the data from these sectors are more easily to obtain. In contrast, other infrastructures like banking and finance, 
commercial facilities, and government facilities, receive relatively less attentions. However, these infrastructures are of 
critical importance to disaster mitigation and recovery as well. Thus, research on interdependencies of these infrastructures 
could be a potential direction. 
Another finding from the table is that most of exiting research use one or two methods, few of them use three or more than 
three methods.  However, as pointed out by Baker et al.(2002), a single method or perspective could not adequate enough to 
capture the behaviors of complex systems; therefore, further study may explore how to integrate these models to improve the 
models’ accuracy.  
 Rinaldi et al. (2001) classify interdependency into four types: physical interdependency, cyber interdependency, and 
geographic interdependency. From our literature survey, we found that the research on cyber interdependency is scarce. The 
reason is that cyber interdependencies are relatively new and are difficult to identify and measure. Therefore, further study 
may focus on cyber interdependency and related issues. Kim et al. (2005) outline the objects of research in this direction. The 
short term objective is to model and simulate the cyber interdependency between critical infrastructures. The long term 
objective is to design information sharing mechanisms for protection of cyber interdependencies within critical 
infrastructures. Such mechanisms include network protocols and communication models. 
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